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WHY EUROPE REJECTED AMERICAN
JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND WHY IT MAY NOT MATTER
*
Alec Stone Sweet

In 1803, when Marbury v. Madison1 was rendered, the French were
busy completing the destruction of independent judicial authority.
That process began in 1789, the year the U.S. Constitution entered
into force. The French law of August 16-24, 1790, which remains in
application today, prohibited j udicial review of legislative and
administrative acts, as did the country's first written constitution,
completed in 1791.2 By 1804, a new legal system had emerged. It was
constructed on the principle - a corollary of legislative sovereignty that courts must not participate in the lawmaking function. The judge
was instead imagined as a virtual "slave of the legislature" or, more
precisely, a slave of the code system of law.3 The codes are statutes
that, in their idealized form, purport to regulate society both
permanently and comprehensively, thereby reducing judicial
discretion to nil. Through mimesis and war, the code system and the
prohibition of judicial review spread across Europe. Although the
nineteenth century saw near continuous regime change, and old states
disappeared or were absorbed into new ones, a relatively stable
constitutional orthodoxy nonetheless prevailed. In this orthodoxy,
constitutions could be revised at the discretion of the lawmaker;
separation of powers doctrines subjugated judicial to legislative
authority; and constraints on the lawmaker's authority, such as rights,
either did not exist or could not be enforced by courts.
In 1903, the leading Public Law scholars in France were busy
mounting what would become a noisy campaign to import judicial
review. The movement would span three republics and as many

* Official Fellow, Chair of Comparative Government, Nuffield College, Oxford. Senior
Fellow, Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School.

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

·

2. " Courts cannot interfere with the exercise of legislative powers, suspend the
application of the laws, nor can they infringe on administrative functions, or take cognizance
of administrative acts of any kind." CONST. tit. III, ch. V, art. 3 (1791). Translations of
French materials are my own.
3. As Marshall was writing Marbury, French lawmakers
were putting the final touches on the Napoleonic Code. For an introduction and overview of
the civil law system, see JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1985).

2744

August 2003]

Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review

2745

generations of scholars. In the end, it failed. The major political
parties, invoking the specter of an American-style "Government of
Judges," consistently blocked proposals to authorize judicial review.
They did so in the name of democracy, that is, to secure the General
Will: the sovereignty of the People as expressed through Parliament. 4
In 2003, after a polite nod to Westminster, parliamentary
sovereignty can be pronounced dead. It was killed off during the
second half of the twentieth century in successive waves of
constitution-making that followed a world war, the overthrow of
military dictatorship in Southern Europe, and the collapse of
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. All European
constitutions written after World War II establish enforceable,
substantive constraints on government, including constraints on
legislative and executive authority, in the form of human rights, the
scope and content of which go far beyond the American Bill of Rights.
With very few exceptions, all such constitutions provide for
"constitutional review" by a "constitutional court." Unlike an
American-style supreme court, the European constitutional court is a
specialized jurisdiction, detached from the judiciary. Its purpose is to
ensure the normative superiority of the constitutional law. Such bodies
have been established in Austria (reestablished in 1945), Italy (1948),
Germany (1949), France (1958), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978), and
Belgium (1985). After 1989, the institution spread to the
post-Communist democracies of the Baltics, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and in still
other states of the former USSR and Yugoslavia.5
In this Article, I explore the question of why constitutional review,
but not American judicial review, spread across Europe. 6 I will also

4. As discussed below, Jean Jacques Rousseau's theory of the General Will (la Volonte
Generale) has been a core component of post-1789 French democratic and constitutional
theory. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Judith R. Masters
trans., Roger D. Masters ed., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762). Article 1 of the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man states: "Statute [la Joi] is the expression of the General
Will."
5. For Western Europe, see ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
COMPARATIVE LAW (1989), and ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES (2000).
For Central and Eastern Europe, see HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000), and CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Wojciech Sadurski ed.,
2002). The activities of Central and East European constitutional courts are regularly
surveyed in the East European Constitutional Review, published by the New York University
Law School. In the inter-war years, Austria, Germany, Spain, and some of the states of
Central Europe had possessed some type of constitutional court, of varying effectiveness.
6. For the purposes of this paper, "constitutional review" refers to the authority of any
governmental institution to declare statutes (and all other acts of government)
unconstitutional. "Judicial review" comprises but one mode of constitutional review: that
which is exercised by the judiciary in the course of processing litigation.

2746

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2744

argue that, despite obvious organic differences between the American
and European systems of review, there is an increasing convergence in
how review actually operates. I proceed as follows. In Part I, I
examine the debate on establishing judicial review in Europe, focusing
on the French. In Parts II and III, I contrast the European and the
American models of review, and briefly discuss why the Kelsenian
constitutional court diffused across Europe. In Part IV, I argue that
despite important formal, institutional distinctions, there is increasing
convergence in how the two systems of review actually operate.
I.

PROHIBITION AND ITS D ISCONTENTS

One enduring legacy of the French Revolution is the prohibition of
judicial review.7 The purpose of the prohibition is to seal off the
"political function" (lawmaking) from the "judicial function" (dispute
resolution), thereby securing the supremacy of statute within the legal
order.
From the first moments of the R�volution, the Rousseauian
identification of legislation with the General Will and legislators with
popular sovereignty was constitutionally enshrined,8 producing a
separation of powers doctrine that rigidly circumscribed judicial
authority. During this period, parliamentarians thought the judiciary a
corrupt and reactionary enemy of social reform and decried the
"confusion of powers" entailed by judicial review (i.e., judicial and
lawmaking functions are alleged to be indistinguishable). Not
surprisingly, the Parlements, judicial institutions that exercised a form
of review over royal acts under the Ancien Regime, were an early
casualty; for all practical purposes, they were abolished by the
Assembly in a decree of 1789.9 Following Rousseau, statutes were to
be the only legitimate source of law, and the codes were to be written
in the most simple and nontechnical language possible. In this way,
politics would be made transparent, the legitimacy of the new social
compact assured, and the multitude of intermediate institutions and
social practices separating the People from the State, and obscuring
that fundamental relationship, could be cleared away. The legislature
7. In France, the prohibition was formalized as a punishable offense in the penal code.
Article 127 of the code states that "judges shall be guilty of an abuse of their authority and
punished with loss of their civil rights" for interfering with the legislature or administration
"by issuing regulations containing legislative provisions, by suspending application of one or
several laws, or by deliberating on whether or not a law will be published or applied." Dating
from the Napoleonic era, the provision has never been abrogated.
8. Article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man states: "Legislation is the
expression of the general will [la volonte generale]."
9. See A. ESMEIN, COURS ELEMENTAIRE D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRANCAIS 5 18-40
(1903); M. PETIET, DU POUVOIR LEGISLATIF EN FRANCE 222 (1891); J.H. SHENNAN, THE
PARLEMENT OF PARIS (1968).
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considered legal science to be one of the more mystifying of these
institutions, and it was hoped and expected that lawyers, and their
penchant for doctrinal commentaries and formalist discourse, would
gradually obsolesce and disappear.10 Judges could then proceed in a
straightforward manner, as civil servants applying the codes.11
To make a convoluted story too simple, the new separation of
powers doctrines favored the development of specialized jurisdictions
detached from the judiciary. France's two supreme courts began just
this way. The Constitution of 1795 established the Tribunal de
cassation to protect lawmakers from judicial usurpation, conferring on
it the power to void judgments "that contain any manifest
contradiction with statutes." Although originally part of the
legislature, Cassation gradually evolved into a supreme appellate
jurisdiction and was later explicitly attached to the judiciary. Civil
judges were also enjoined from reviewing the legality of administrative
acts, although a system of review gradually developed within the
administration itself, without express constitutional authorization.
Today, the administrative courts operate as an autonomous "judicial"
system under the supervision of a specialized section of the Conseil
d'etat.
Constitutional review mechanisms were periodically proposed, and
some were in fact established. In 1793, the Abbe Sieyes failed to force
a vote in the Chambre des deputees on his scheme to create a Grand
jury ("to protect citizens against the oppression of the legislative body
and the executive")12; but he later succeeded in vesting abstract review
powers in what became the Senate of Napoleon's First Empire.
Bonaparte's Senate never annulled a legislative or executive act, but
the Emperor did use it to overturn judicial decisions he did not like, as

10, DONALD R. KELLEY, HISTORIANS AND THE LAW IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY
FRANCE 44 (1984).
1 1 . Although reformers recognized that problems of application might arise for judges,
they worked to assure that only legislators could provide stable solutions. In 1799, one such
parliamentarian put it this way:
Only the legislature has the authority to interpret the law. . . . Without this principle, judges
would embark on a vast, unobstructed course of interpreting statutes according to their
imaginations . . . and even their passions. Judicial institutions would thus be entirely
deformed. Judges would be able to substitute their will for that of the statute . . . and
establish themselves as legislators.
Quoted in J. BOURDON, LA REFORME JUDICIARE DE L'AN VIII 432-33 (1942).
12. The proposal was rejected after a vote on the following motion to dismiss:
considering that a court of this type already exists - it's called public opinion - and that a
new such court would be disastrous for the freedom of opinion of the legislative body . . .
and considering that the People are always here, that they examine the conduct of their
representatives and possess the power to punish them for their abuses; I insist that this
amendment be rejected.
Debats, Archives parlementaires, June 16, 1793, at 576-77.
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well as "to fill gaps in the constitution."13 Although the Senate
disappeared in 1815, it was revived by Napoleon III for the Second
Empire, if to no noticeable effect. The Fourth Republic (1946-58) had
its Constitutional Committee, a bizarre body composed of
parliamentarians who never actually reviewed a legislative act.1 4
Finally, for the Fifth Republic (1958-), General De Gaulle and his
agents established a quasi-Bonapartist institution,15 the Constitutional
Council, as a means of ensuring executive control over the legislature.
The Council now operates on a radically different basis, mainly to
review the constitutionality of legislation that has been proposed by
the executive and adopted by parliament, before it has entered into
force. As discussed at length in Part III, pre-enforcement
constitutional review - which Europeans call abstract review
is
today found across the Continent. In France, the various constitutional
review mechanisms established after 1789 have always been of an
abstract nature. The logic, again, flows from separation of powers
(legislative sovereignty): once a statute has entered into force, its legal
validity may not be challenged.
From the perspective of French separation of powers orthodoxies,
the judicial function can only be a negligible one. As Merryman writes:
"Legislative positivism, the dogma of the separation of powers, the
ideology of codification, the attitude toward interpretation of
statutes . . . all these tend to diminish the judge and to glorify the
Iegislator."1 6 But appearances can deceive. In the rest of this section, I
describe and evaluate what I will show to be a "relatively" - and
meaningfully - "autonomous" French legal tradition. The French use
the term le Droit to describe the complex relationship between legal
institutions, j urisprudence, and legal scholarship, with an emphasis on
the latter. The community of legal scholars is also called la Doctrine. I
will use both these terms. By relative autonomy, I mean the extent to
which le Droit, and especially the legal discourse propagated by la
Doctrine, does not conform to the classical model described above,
-

13. IRENE COLLINS, NAPOLEON AND HIS PARLIAMENTS 63 (1979).
14. The establishment of the Constitutional Committee is discussed in ALEC STONE,
THE BI RTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27-29 (1992).
15. General de Gaulle had little patience for legal niceties, once stating:
Three things count in constitutional matters.First, the higher interest of the country ... and
of that I alone am judge. Second, far behind, are the political circumstances, arrangements,
tactics ....Third, much further behind, there is legalism. . . . I have accomplished nothing in
my life except by putting the welfare of the country first and by refusing to be entrapped by
legalisms.

James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 212-13. Later de
Gaulle asked of a biographer, "Do you really believe I am bound by the constitution?" Id.
16. MERRYMAN, supra note 3, at 56.
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evolving, instead, its own internally derived set of moral and
professional standards of conduct.17
A wide range of judicial activities may provide evidence of
autonomy, each likely flowing from one common source: the deeply
held philosophical attachment to the notion of the law as a holistic
system, with its own internal means of determining purpose and
meaning. Simplifying, because the aim of le Droit is to perfect this
system, it is thought both natural and necessary to insulate the law
from the vagaries of the social world. There is, accordingly, a deep
animosity to the incursion of le Politique
partisan passions,
goings-on in parliament, and the like - because "things political"
threaten to undermine this effort at perfection.
The widespread devotion to the law-politics distinction explains to
a large extent why the public law - constitutional and administrative
law - has always suffered a relative lack of prestige within the ranks
of the French legal community. Because private, especially economic,
relations were traditionally considered to be outside the interference
of government, the civil (or "private") law became the center of
gravity for legal philosophy and science. Indeed, as Kelley notes, the
civil code served almost "a constitutional function" for le Droit, being
"the area of law in which the sole function of government was the
recognition and enforcement of private rights."18 In the nineteenth
century, judges and publicists consciously exploited the relationship
between judicial authority and the defense of fundamental, that is,
"natural," rights and were largely successful in reestablishing judicial
primacy over interpretation.19 In contrast, the public lawyer's universe
is a provisional one, continually being scrambled by first one
manifestation of political power, before being recast by another. For
the whole of the nineteenth century, a stable set of public liberties can
be located only with great difficulty and are seemingly impossible to
defend juridically.
The most dramatic evidence of the relative autonomy of public law
is to be found in doctrinal materials, not in the judgments of courts. In
France, the ideology of codification did not succeed in eliminating
legal discourse, although that was one of the ambitions of the code
system.20 On the contrary, the legal scholar reemerged as the principal
-

17. The question of how to define and then operationalize concepts associated with the
"relative autonomy" of legal institutions, legal discourse, or "legal consciousness" is a
complex one that I do not consider fully here. See STONE, supra note 14, at 10-15, ch. 1;
Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Rogers Smith, Political
Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism," and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 89 (1988).
18. MERRYMAN, supra note 3, at 92-93.
19. KELLEY, supra note 10, at 56-71 , 134.
20. "Bonaparte, watching the rising tide of jurisprudence, is said to have cried: 'My code
is lost.' " KELLEY, supra note 10, at 44.
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protagonist in the ongoing project to perfect the legal system,
facilitated by the community's insularity. Indeed, an extraordinary
renaissance of public law occurred during the second decade of the
Third Republic, and the discipline subsequently entered a golden age.
I can only offer some tentative explanations for the causes of this
Renaissance. First, although the prior century was an unstable one no constitution had lasted more than fourteen years - by at least the
1890s a remarkable consensus had developed on the utility of the
constitutional laws of 1875 (perhaps because they were so flexible). By ,
the early twentieth century, the Third Republic and its constitutional
life had come to be seen as a natural state of affairs. Second, a series of
laws which sought to guarantee what in France are called "public
liberties" were passed - on free association, union membership, '
freedom of the press, and so on - and these came to be seen as part
of a judicially applicable bill of rights. Third, and partly in
consequence of the above, the Conseil d'etat was gradually assuming a
judicial identity of its own.21 Fourth, new social movements,
particularly on the left, were perceived by legal scholars as significant
threats. Many of these scholars worked to show that a fundamental
purpose of le Droit was to develop, as a means of achieving social
order, what was alleged to be the law's inherent function of social
integration.22
In any event, during this period public law began to be taught as a
separate branch of the law, and la Doctrine began to evolve
independently. Specialized journals appeared, treatises multiplied and
lengthened, and scholars, drifting away from projects oriented
primarily to order the chaos of constitutional history, became
consumed with the study of case law, especially the Conseil d'etat's.
Statutes ceased to be recognized as dominant sources of law, freeing
doctrinal commentary to lobby courts, not least to convince judges to
rebel against strict separation of powers. In sum, this revival
constituted a self-conscious movement to increase the prestige of
Public Law and the social power of public lawyers. In 1894, the
founder and first editor of the Revue du droit public, lamenting the
·

21. In 1872, the Conseil d'etat was expressly recognized as a court, and it asserted for
itself independence from the direct control of the ministries in 1889. It was thus able to
shake off some of the taint of its imperial origins, and to provide a stable source of doctrinal
commentary.
22. Henry Nezard argued that "it is certain that, provoked by the frequency of abusive
and arbitrary laws made in evident violation of every judicial sense, a powerful doctrinal
movement developed to bestow upon the courts the power to refuse to apply laws contrary
to the Constitution." A. ESMEIN, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 133 (1921). It is unlikely that
Third Republic legislation was more abusive than what had occurred in the past - by any
standard. On the contrary, it is much more likely that the movement developed when it did
because for the first time there was a greater chance that policymakers could be influenced
by la Doctrine.
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fact that all too often politicians and journalists ignore la Doctrine,
explained the Revue's "program" in the journal's inaugural issue:
We hope that the idea of public law, that the forms of public law, that the
procedures of public law will penetrate more deeply, each and every day,
into constitutional, administrative, and international matters. Then and
only then can any institution acquire the force of resistance that will
permit it to brave the storms which will confront it.23

This formative period in the history and sociology of modem
French public law24 yielded a coherent argument for judicial
autonomy, founded on the rejection of the ideology of the General
Will: legislative sovereignty and its attendant prohibition against
judicial review. This argument can be broken down into three main
elements: (a) the belief, traceable to legal theorists of the A ncien
Regime, that the constitution enjoys a special status as "higher law" in
any hierarchy of legal norms, and that the judicial protection of that
hierarchy is essential to the achievement of both political legitimacy
and social order; (b) the belief that American-style judicial review is
the only acceptable form of constitutional review, and that judges are
morally and professionally required to begin exercising its review
authority immediately; and (c) the effort to show that the evolution
toward judicial review is not only natural and inevitable, but that
judges had already begun doing it. Each of these elements will be
examined in tum.
A. La Doctrine, Normative Hierarchies, and the "Necessity" of
Judicial Review
The inclination to construct and then secure normative hierarchies
is a central focus of European constitutional theory. The logical result
of the statutory sovereignty is to make such efforts relatively simple:
statute takes precedent over ministerial decree, decree takes
precedent over a local regulation, and so on. But this was not always
the case. The pre-Revolutionary notion of limitations to absolute
monarchical sovereignty, flowing from the scholarly development of
the natural law, is an example. What is remarkable about modem (i.e.,
post-1890) legal discourse is the extent to which publicists embraced
neo-natural law ideals, seizing upon the rejection of the official
hierarchy as inimical to le Droit itself. As Leon Duguit, arguably
France's most influential public law scholar through the early decades
of the twentieth century, wrote in 1917:
[T] he persistent effort of French judicial doctrine has ever been, from
1789 to the present time, to find the true juristic basis for the legal
23. Ferdinand Larnaude, Notre programme, 1 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 3-4 (1894).
24. I am aware of no scholarly treatment of either.
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limitation upon the power of the State, and to insure its sanction. Its
conceptions have been diverse . . . . But the end in view has always been
the same; namely, to prove that the powers of the State are limited by a
jural principle (une regle de droit) superior to the State itself.
Does there exist a jural principle (une regle de droit) superior to the
State, which forbids it from doing certain things and commands it to do
certain others? . . . If the answer is no, then there is no public law, since
no act or refusal to act on the part of the State will be contrary to law. 25

And elsewhere:
[W]e believe firmly that there is a rule of law above the individual and
the State, above the rulers and the ruled; a rule which is compulsory on
one and on the other; and we hold that if there is such a thing as
sovereignty of the State, it is juridically limited by this rule of law. . . .
[T]o express this in words . . . is that of legal art. If this is too much for
legal science and legal art, their study is not worth a moment's effort. 26

Scholars worked to reconstruct the foundations of their field by
positing the existence of an overarching higher law, to be elaborated
and refined by le Droit, that is through scholarly activity. They grafted
their project onto deep roots in the French legal tradition. Certain
physiocratic legal scholars, like Dupont, Le Trosne, Le Vauguyon, and
Le Mercier, had refined theories of judicial authority based on just
such notions before being overwhelmed by the events of the
Revolution. 27 In these theories, "the laws of absolute and essential
justice" were considered to be God's law, presocial and unwritten,
which judges alone had the capacity to discover, interpret, and apply.
In the domain of positive law, the constitutional laws - those which
establish the organization of the state and the procedures for
legislating - were thought supreme and the foundation of all social
order. Thus, no ordinary law could be considered to have legal status
if it did not conform to them. Higher law also structured conceptions
of the judicial role: judges, it was argued, had an "inescapable," even
"religious," duty to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws. "Ignominy
and disgrace would be heaped upon [their] heads" - worse, the social
order would collapse - if they failed to fulfill this duty.28 While these
notions lost their force during the century after the Revolution, major

25. Leon Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1917). Duguit spent
some time at the Harvard Law School during this period.
26. Leon Duguit, Theory of Objective Law A nterior to the State, in MODERN FRENCH
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 237-48 ( Arthur w. Spencer ed., 1921).
27. See MARIO EINAUDI, THE PHYSIOCRATIC DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL
(1938). Einaudi leaves the French quotations in their original French; the translations here
are therefore my own.
28. Id. at 35-45, 71.
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figures such as the Abbey de Sieyes29 and Benjamin Constant30 gave
them periodic salience. Both echoed Sieyes's famous phrase iterated before Marshall handed down Marbury - that: "A
constitution is a body of obligatory laws, or it is nothing,"31 and
therefore must not be "reduced to [the status of] a cheap chapter in
the civil code. "32
After 1890, no major figure in French public law took issue with
the logic of Sieyes and Marshall. Henceforth, doctrinal commentary
on the written sources of Public Law begin with the constitution,
rather than statute. Maurice Hauriou asserted that:
The national Constitution, being the most direct expression of national
sovereignty is the supreme law of the land. This superiority consists of
two elements: 1) the Constitution delegates powers to the representative
institutions, which the Constitution has established; 2) the Constitution is
superior to ordinary law, a superiority which logically leads to a system in
which provisions of ordinary laws which are contrary to the text or the
principles of the constitution are invalid.33

This point is made dogmatically, even by treatise writers such as Carre
de Malberg who opposed, as a practical matter (because not in
principle), the introduction of judicial review into France.34
Given judges' almost fanatical worship of statute, the reverence for
statute was viewed as the great obstacle to be overcome by le Droit.
The enemy of the movement was Rousseau, "the father of 'Jacobin
despotism,' and 'Caesarian dictatorship.' "35 "We must attack at its
root the belief in the absolute power of the General Will," Hauriou
writes, "Few false doctrines have had so evil an influence as that
doctrine."36 Duguit set about to show his colleagues that the orthodox,
"metaphysical conception" of statute, according to which legislation
constitutes "the formulated command of [indivisible] sovereign
power," could no longer be sustained. By "metaphysical,'' Duguit
simply meant the traditional notion of the state as a sovereign unity, or
"person," against which he offered his "realist" notion, of the state as
a multi-organization entity made up of many individuals: "A statute is
simply the expression of the individual will of the men who make it ...

29. EMMANUEL SJEYES, Qu'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS ETAT (Droz ed., 1970) (1789).
30. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, COURS DE POLITIQUE CONSTITUTIONNELLE (1819).
31. PAUL BASTID, SJEYES ET SA PENSEE 598 (1 939) (quoting Sieyes).
32. J.H. CLAPHAM, THE ABBE SJEYES: AN ESSAY IN THE POLITICS OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION (1912).
33. MAURICE HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 261 (1923).
34. See infra note 39.
35. KENNETH H.F. DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE 172-73
(1980).
36. MAURICE HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DU DROIT PUBLIC 235 (1910).
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the private members of a legislative body. Beyond that we are in the
realm of fiction."37 Gaston Jeze, the editor of the Revue du droit public
in 1924, echoed Duguit:
Statutes do not express the national will; in France, a law is merely the
manifestation of the will of the individuals - deputies and senators who have voted for it. Deputies and senators say of course that they
represent the national will. But this assertion can not change the reality
of the situation. Juridically, a statute is only the manifestation of a certain
number of individuals.38

This "realist" notion of the statute expresses a deep mistrust and a
scarcely veiled animosity toward parliament, or what la Doctrine calls
"political authority." Statutes, according to Jeze, because they are
made by politicians - "whose technical competence might be
mediocre and whose impartiality and spirit of justice might be
questioned" - statutes, "no longer merit . . . the fetishism and the
idolatry with which they have been invested."
The hard reality was that the constitutional laws of 1875 were
wholly inadequate as sources for the substantive limitation of
legislative sovereignty. As skeptics like Carre de Malberg pointed out,
they contained no reference to any body of fundamental rights or even
to general principles of law; they "formulated no judicial rules" and
were "vague and general" even as to procedural requirements. Worse,
explicit provisions reinforced rather then eroded parliamentary
sovereignty - simple legislation was all that was required to amend
them, for example.39 The movement countered by arguing that the
constitution contained juridically discoverable, unwritten provisions,
as well as the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. Hauriou's
argument on the former is representative:
It would be an error to believe that the principle of constitutional
supremacy only included that which is written in the Constitution; it
includes many other things, for example . . . the principles of
individualism [l'ordre individualiste] which are at the foundation of the
State . . . . These principles constitute a kind of constitutional legitimacy
which take their place above even the written constitution.40
37. LEON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 70 (1919).
38. Gaston Jeze, Le contr6/e juridictionnel des lois, 41 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 402
(1924).
39. R. CARRE DE MALBERG, 2 CONTRIBUTION A LA THEORIE GENERALE DE L'ETAT
545-50, 576-622 (1922). Carre de Malberg, although sympathetic to the movement's
objectives and to judicial review in theory, was the most influential public law specialist to
remain faithful to the traditional model. His position was that since legislative and
constituent powers were fused in France, these debates were entirely academic. Still, he
argued that as a matter of legal science, the French doctrine of legislative sovereignty was
"unacceptable." Id. at 549-50 n.33.
40. MAURICE HAURIOU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 298 (1923). The notion that
individual rights are the basis of higher law is echoed even by those who were not ready to
support the introduction of judicial review. See ESMEIN, supra note 22, at 29-30.
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As for the Declaration, Duguit argued that since this list of rights had
been adopted before any written constitution, and had never been
abrogated, it must be considered an immutable feature of the
constitutional landscape. 41 For his part, Hauriou called the declaration
a constituent part of a permanent "social constitution," "the basis of
public law," and thus higher than even the written, "political"
constitution. 42
No violence is done to this doctrinal movement by describing it in
terms the physiocrats would recognize, namely, in terms of natural
law. 43 For its proponents, the constitution is only partially and
imperfectly written; the solemn function of le Droit and judicial
authority is to complete and perfect the constitution by, in essence,
incorporating the natural law. Once the constitution is expanded in
this way, once higher law is made the source of all legitimate
authority, all laws, including the constitutional text, must conform to
them, or be themselves unconstitutional. And since the development
of the unwritten, extra- or supraconstitutional law is a domain wholly
within the purview of le Droit, le Droit must be recognized as a
sovereign authority in itself. 4 4 "This school does not recognize the
sovereignty of the State, but only the sovereignty of le Droit, and this
formula deserves approval,'' wrote Roubier. From this perspective,
nee-natural law doctrines may be characterized as functionally
equivalent to rule of law notions in Anglo-American legal theory.
That is, they both attempt to rationalize the coexistence of a system of
judicially enforced limitations on public authority on the one hand
with a sovereign lawmaker on the other (a task made more difficult
for the French in the absence of the legitimizing notion, inherent in
common-law doctrines, that judges help to make the law as they
decide cases).
Against this onslaught, the traditional separation of powers
doctrine crumbled and was swept away, and with it the illegitimate
prohibition against judicial review. "Any unconstitutional law,"
Duguit asserted, "contrary to a superior principle of le Droit, inscribed
or not . . . written or not . . . is a law without effect, a law without
executory force,'' and one that people, most of all judges, ought to
41. LEON DUGUIT, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 673 (1923).
42. HAURIOU, supra note 40, at 297-300.
43. PAUL ROUBIER, THEORIE GENERALE DU DRO!T 182-92 (2d ed. 1951); Frani,ois
Geny, La Notion de Droit en France, in 1 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT ET DE
SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 9, 18 ( 1931). There were, of course, great differences in form and
substance between the natural law as articulated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
and that propagated by neo-natural lawyers in the first part of the twentieth century.
Neo-natural lawyers, for example, viewed the law not as fixed and unchanging across time
and space, but as an evolutive product of legal science and judicial activity. See CARL
JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 181 (1963).
44. ROUBIER, supra note 43, at 281.
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disobey.45 Whereas opponents of judicial review had long argued that
the review of legislation would lead to legal uncertainty and social
chaos, Duguit and others turned the argument on its head: disorder is
brought about by legislators who disregard and violate the "objective"
norms discovered and developed by le Droit.46 Judicial review, on the
other hand, has the power to reinforce or restore systemic legitimacy
in the face of despotism. In the absence of review, legislation that
violates "inalienable and imprescriptible natural rights" may be
promulgated, and its enforcement might lead, or even require, citizens
to exercise their natural right to revolt against an unjust regime.47
The dominant model of judicial authority for French public law
specialists was provided by America.48 From at least 1890 until well
after 1958, every major figure in French public law condemned the
very idea of a special constitutional court detached from the judiciary,
and instead praised the American system.49 They condemned "political
review" exercised by a state organ detached from the judiciary without
reference to what Americans would call a "case or controversy."
Equally important, critics argued that if a special constitutional court
was to be established, and was to operate effectively, the practice of
constitutional review would be continuously embroiled in political and
partisan controversy. It was therefore thought necessary that review
be separated from the legislative function. As Hauriou wrote:
We condemn absolutely any system of constitutional review by a political
organ because such review must be both independent from and
inoffensive to the government. . . . Such review, of whatever type, which
occurs during the law-making process, and which hinders or even delays
a law's promulgation, risks provoking the worst conflicts, because it
confronts parliament in the heat of that process. One of the wisest
policies of le Droit consists in refusing to intervene . . . until after the fires
have calmed, and political passions are no longer engaged. Premature
intervention would lead to conflict without end, and would compromise
the judge himself in [partisan] battles. We must therefore wait until the
law has been promulgated, and sometimes long afterwards, before the
question of its constitutionality is to be raised . . . . It's for this reason that
we are obliged to turn toward the judge, if still taking precautions to see
45. DUGUIT, supra note 41, at 660-68.
46. See Duguit, supra note 25.
47. ROUBIER, supra note 43, at 282.
48. In 1881, A. Saint-Girons wrote in his extremely influential Essai sur la separation des
pouvoirs: "If ever our country was to be so happy to enjoy a system of judicial authority as
well organized as in the United States, if ever the tenacity with which revolutionary
prejudices was lost, we would finally understand that judges are not the enemy to weaken,
but the truest friend of public liberties." A. SAINT-GIRONS, ESSA! SUR LA SEPARATION DES
POUVOIRS 545-61 (1881 ) .
49. I know of no exceptions. Even the great critic of the movement, Carre de Malberg,
called the American system of judicial review "the best expression of the principle of
national sovereignty." See MALBERG, supra note 39, at 545-50.
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that his role does not become political, that is, by rigorously restricting it
to the litigation process.50

American constitutional theory provided the movement with a
powerful reinterpretation of the separation of powers. The classic
texts (the law of 1790 and the constitution of 1791 quoted above), it
was argued, were either no longer applicable to the "modern
judiciary," or only prohibited pre-enforcement (abstract) review by
judges. That is, judges were enjoined from "suspending the execution"
of duly adopted laws, something quite different from refusing to apply
them in the judicial domain.51 Judicial review, in the normal discharge
of the j udicial function, however, violates no separation of powers;
instead, control constitutes the fulfillment of the judicial function to
resolve legal disputes. A nineteenth-century American rationalization
is imported in its entirety and applied to the contemporary situation in
France. Duguit stated:
It has long been accepted dogma that no court could accept a plea of
unconstitutionality and refuse to apply a formal statute even where they
considered it unconstitutional. . . . The principle of the separation of
powers leads to an entirely different solution. A court which refuses to
apply a statute on the grounds of unconstitutionality does not interfere
with the exercise of legislative powers. It does not suspend its
application. The law remains untouched . . . . It is simply because the
judicial power is distinct from and independently equal to the two others
that it cannot be forced to apply the statutes it deems unconstitutional.5 2

Duguit and his colleagues, believing that judges could be "led" by la
Doctrine and "the sheer force of events to this conclusion,"53 began to
lobby judges directly.
The movement worked to show judges that they were juridically
required to exercise what Americans would call substantive judicial
review; they also argued that judges had already begun doing so, but
apparently did not yet know it.5 4 The most important line of decisions
supporting this interpretation involved the right of public employees
to strike, heard by the Conseil d'etat, beginning with Winkell (1909).55
That case involved a provision of a 1905 law that required the
government, if it were to fire certain classes of state employees, to
notify the latter, in writing and in advance, of the reasons for dismissal.
Mr. Winkell's contract was terminated, along with a large number of
his postal service colleagues, after having taken part in a postal strike,
50. HAURIOU, supra note 33, at 267-68.
51. Id. at 281-82.
52. DUGUIT, supra note 37, at 87.
53. Id. at 92.
54. Id. at 89.
55. WINKELL, 3 CONSEIL D'ETAT 147 (1909).
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and he brought action on the grounds that prior notification had not
been given. The Conseil d'etat, appealing to no source of law and
making no other attempt to justify its decision, ruled simply that the
law was not applicable in dismissals pursuant to strikes involving
public employees (despite the fact that the law contained no such
exception).
Hauriou (whose influence was enormous, not least because he
wrote the doctrinal notes on administrative jurisprudence published in
the quasi-official Recueil Sirey and in the Revue du droit p ublic for
more than three decades) argued that, if correct, the decision to refuse
to apply the law could make sense only if the Conseil d'etat believed
that the law violated a higher, constitutional principle. Hauriou found
this principle in certain provisions of the constitutional law of
February 25, 1875. Among other things, these gave to the executive
the power to "name civil employees" and, Hauriou inferred, the
responsibility to ensure "the continuity of public service." In a long
line of subsequent cases, the Conseil d'etat appeared to adopt
Hauriou's line of reasoning, and even his language, although it did not
reference the constitution or the power of constitutional review.
Hauriou, Duguit, and others then began to claim that the judges
"without expressly admitting it, and perhaps without even admitting it
to themselves, have opened the way to judicial review."5 6
In the 1920s, this campaign achieved an extraordinarily high
degree of visibility, and began to be debated publicly in the press.57
Outsiders took notice. In 1921, Edouard Lambert's study of American
judicial politics
The Government of Judges and the Struggle A gainst
Social Legislation in the United States
appeared, and quickly
became essential reading.58 Lambert's work radically departed from
traditional French public law scholarship. He eschewed formalist
exegesis of jurisprudence and abstract legal categories, focusing
instead on the socialization and ideological orientation of judges.
Empirically, Lambert chose to analyze a broad class of judicial
decisions: those that had blocked whole categories of economic
legislation (case law that Americans classify as "substantive due
process" review). Lambert's thesis was twofold. First, by virtue of their
social origins, educations, and recruitment, judges were always
reactionary, to the point of being dangerous to the proper evolution of
society. Second, judicial review, because it inevitably leads to
-

-

56. HAURIOU, supra note 40, at 319. Six years later, Hauriou wrote: "[I]t can no longer
be contested that the Conseil d'etat was not engaged . . . in interpreting the constitution, and
with great vigor . . . based on the constitutional principle of the continuity of public service."
HAURIOU, supra note 33, at 286; see DUGUIT, supra note 37, at 90-91.
57. See the newspaper, LE TEMPS, Nov. 14-29, 1925.
58. EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTTE CONTRE LA
LEGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ETAS-UNIS (Marcel Giard & Cie eds., 1 92 1 ).
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judge-made constitutions, must also inevitably give effective governing
power to courts. Lambert introduced the term gouvernement des juges
- which refers to any situation in which judges effectively make,
rather than merely apply the law - into French parlance.
Lambert, who meant his book to be read as a direct response to
"the skillful and perseverant campaign . . . to introduce into our
constitutional life judicial review," argued that an American
Government of Judges situation would be the likely result if the
movement were to succeed.59 Pointing out that le Droit in France was
dominated by conservative, individualist notions of classic liberalism
and neo-natural law, Lambert's conclusion was unequivocal:
The day when the French judiciary acquires the power of judicial review,
it will discover in our Declaration of rights all of the constituent pieces of
what I have described as due process of law, and which have provided
the means by which the American judiciary to force the legislature to
bow to their supremacy. The same patient and surreptitious
play of constitutional decision-making, which permitted American
jurisprudence . . . to enclose the legislature in a network of constitutional
limitations which every day becomes more dense, will probably enable
ours to bind the French legislature as quickly and quite as tightly.60

French political life would be permanently altered: laissez-faire
capitalism and its attendant morality would be frozen judicially while
society evolved away from both; working-class movements would be
frustrated and become dangerously alienated; and political parties
would seek to control the recruitment of judges as a necessary means
to ensure the success of their programs. 61
Lambert's book had an incredible impact: it destroyed whatever
effective political support for judicial review that existed within
parliament and weakened doctrinal consensus. For politicians,
according to Lemasurier: "Judicial review was no longer considered to
be only . . . 'a play thing for jurists,' nor even a means of defending
individual liberties, but was henceforth a weapon in the hands of
Reaction" - palatable only to the far right and to representatives of
monopoly capital. 62 Whereas before 1921, the doctrinal community
was all but unanimously in favor of judicial review, once dutiful
adherents began to express their reticence, including the editor of the
Revue du droit public, Gaston Jeze. Having been an advocate of
judicial review since at least 1895, 63 he withdrew his support in an
59. Id. at 4-7.
60. Id. at 227.
61. Id. at 220-74.
62. JEANNE LEMASURIER, LA CONSTITUTION DE 1946 ET LE CONTROLE
JURIDICTIONNEL DU LEGJSLATEUR 22 (R. Pinchon & R. Durand-Auzias eds., 1954).
63. Gaston Jeze, Con/role des deliberations des assemblees de/iberantes, 2 REVUE
GENERALE D'ADMINISTRATION, May-Aug. 1895, at 401, 411.
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influential editorial-style article in 1924.6 4 Jeze did not hesitate to
confirm - approvingly - that le Droit had conclusively demonstrated
the logical necessity of judicial review, but he dismissed the
movement's demonstrations that the courts had already begun doing it
as acts of "pure imagination."6 5 Unfortunately, he argued, "At the
present, French public law being what is applied presently by the
courts . . . the power to control the constitutionality of legislation does
not exist"; and this would remain the case, he argued, so long as judges
suffered from low prestige and lacked sufficient independence. 6 6 In his
opinion, following Lambert, judicial review, far from increasing
judicial prestige and authority, could very well have the opposite
effect:
Let us suppose, and the hypothesis is not an idle one, that the
ordinary courts or even a supreme court showed itself hostile towards
democratic, social, or fiscal reforms. Under the pretext of substantive
judicial review, these courts would have the formidable power to block,
judicially, reform legislation of this kind. We would then have a
government of judges.
And towards what result? Conflict between a democratically elected
parliament desirous of social reform . . . and uudicial authority] . . . would
lead to the obliteration of the judges, to the discredit of the courts, and a
new diminution of the prestige and of the independence necessary to the
judiciary. . . . May the French courts avoid such a catastrophic course!67

In 1936, the practical side of the debate was put to rest by the
courts themselves. In A rrighi, the Conseil d'etat, echoing Jeze, ruled
that: "In the present state of French public law, this ground of appeal
[the unconstitutionality of a statute enabling an administrative act]
may not be entered before the Conseil d'etat," a position subsequently
adhered to by other courts. 68 The doctrinal debate did not die, even
during Nazi occupation, but was left hanging pending the outcome of
the drafting of a new constitution.
B.

Rejecting Review and Rights

With the demise of the Vichy regime, a Constituent Assembly,·
comprised of representatives of more than two dozen political parties,
began the task of drafting a new constitution (for the Fourth Republic,
1946-58). The Assembly's deliberations are important for two reasons.
64. See Jeze, supra note 38.
65. Id. at 400-01, 408-1 1 .
66. Id. at 412-13.
67. Id. at 421-22 (footnote omitted).
68. LEMASURIER, supra note 62, at 170 (footnote omitted). See id. at 169-72 for a
discussion of this caselaw.
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First, for the first time since the Revolution, national representatives
voted on the question of whether to establish judicial review in
France.69 In December 1945, a committee of the first Assembly
rejected a proposal for an American-style supreme court, by a vote of
39-2. In April 1946, elements within the Right again tried to gain
support for a supreme court (this time to be composed of four
politicians chosen by parliament, and four judges to be selected by the
Conseil d'etat and the Cour de cassation, with the President of the
Republic acting as president and ninth member). The initiative was
not brought to a vote. Instead, the Assembly adopted, 289-259, a
resolution repudiating, as inimical to the French .constitutional order,
the principle of "constitutional review."70
Second, although they failed to enshrine constitutional rights, the
founders of the Fourth Republic managed to express their attachment
to rights in a Preamble to the Constitution, a text that would
ultimately transform French law. In a decision of 197171
hailed by
some as France's Marbury v. Madison72
the Constitutional Council
began to incorporate a bill of rights into the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic (1958-). It found these rights in the Preamble to the 1946
Constitution, which is mentioned by the Preamble to the 1958
Constitution. The Council did so despite the fact that the founders of
the Fifth Republic, too, had firmly rejected proposals to establish or
refer to constitutional rights in the constitution proper.73
The very existence of the 1946 Preamble resulted from the
founders' failure to unambiguously "constitutionalize" an updated
version of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. On the opening
of the first Constitutional Assembly, the three major party groupings
agreed that the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was out of date
and would have to be substantially revised to be acceptable; indeed,
the Assembly voted 429-119 against outright incorporation of the 1789
text.7 4 The deputies then devoted fully one quarter of their rancorous,
-

-

69. During the Third Republic, a proposal to institute judicial review was dismissed
without a vote. One response was recorded: "It should be added that our colleague wants to
destroy the constitution," Anna/es de la Chambre des deputes, Debats parlementaires, Jan. 28,
1903, at 328.
70. LEMASURIER, supra note 62, at 32.
71. Decree No. 71-44, RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DU CONSEI L CONSTITUTIONNEL, 1 971,
at 29. For an account of this decision and its consequences for legislative sovereignty, see
STONE, supra note 14, at 66-92, and Alec Stone, Where Judicial Politics A re Legislative
Politics, 15 W. EUR. POL. 29 (1992).
72. George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Was it France's Marbury v. Madison?, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
910 (1974).
73. See STONE, supra note 14, at 49.
74. GORDON WRIGHT, THE RESHAPING OF FRENCH D EMOCRACY 136-58 (1948). For
an overview of these politics, see PHILIP WILLIAMS, POLITICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE:
PARTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC (1958).
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often paralyzing, debates to the question of rights, exposing an almost
"unbridgeable gulf between Marxist materialism and collectivism on
the one hand, and Christian democracy and individualism on the
other."75 Upon completion, the new declaration of rights became the
first chapter of the Constitution of April 1946, subsequently rejected
by the electorate in referendum. Had the April 1946 Constitution
entered into force, the declaration would have become part of French
constitutional law, and thereby binding on parliament. As the
Rapporteur of the drafting committee, Gilbert Zaksas (Socialist),
neatly stated, "The declaration is a true judicial text, part of the whole
of the constitution."7 6 Raoul Calas (Communist) agreed: the "nation's
representatives of tomorrow will be obliged to conform to it, and to
translate its spirit into legislation."77
Americans, however, might be surprised to learn that the
'
Constituent Assembly did not mean to subjugate the authority of the
parliamentary statute to that of constitutional rights. Edouard Herriot
summarized the situation in these terms:
In the solemn hierarchy of texts that guarantee the liberties of the
people, there are 3 rungs. There is, first, statute, which determines how
principles will be applied . . . . Below legislation, there is the constitution,
which brings together the organic principles [organizing] the life of this
state. And below the constitution, there is the declaration of rights and
responsibilities, which comes into play where politics meets or, more
precisely, should meet, morality.78

Had the constitution of April 1946 been ratified, France would indeed
have seen the birth of a new bill of rights, but not therefore the
inevitable death of parliamentary sovereignty.
For those who drafted the Constitution of October 1946, the
judicial enforceability of rights was a dead issue. In order to save
themselves time and perhaps another embarrassing rejection by the
electorate, the drafting committee voted unanimously to remove the
chapter on rights from the constitutional text, and to include a general
statement of principles in a Preamble.79 All agreed that the Preamble
would not be enforceable. Jacques Bardoux, who led the fight both to
establish a bill of rights and judicial review in the constitution,
complained that: "The Preamble does not have the force of law. Its
prescriptions, purely verbal and platonic, bind no one, neither the
simple citizen, nor the public authorities, nor this Assembly, which is'
75. 0.R. TAYLOR, THE FOURTH REPUBLIC OF FRANCE: CONSTITUTION AND
POLITICAL PARTIES 18-19 (1951).
76. Debats, Assemblee Nationale Constituante, Mar. 7, 1946, J.O. 1946, at 607.
77. Id. at 617.
78. Id. at 639.
79. An English translation of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution is found in STONE,
supra note 14, at 257-58.
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henceforth free to contradict [it]. . . . "80 Most understood the
Preamble, as another member of the Assembly put it, to be "a polite
bow to the general rules of the polity," and certainly not "a juridical
expression in a form which a judge could one day apply."81 I can find
no affirmation to the contrary, even by minor figures, in the debates of
the Second Assembly.
In any case, the structure of the final text of the Preamble was not
conducive to straightforward judicial application. To the general
satisfaction of the Right, the Preamble states simply that "the French
people solemnly reaffirm the rights and liberties consecrated by the
Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the fundamental principles
recognized by the laws of the Republics." These latter "principles"
were left unenumerated, but everyone understood the phrase with
reference to the principle of "freedom of education," a code for
protecting the Catholic school system. As compensation for the Left
and collectivist center, the vast bulk of the Preamble consecrates a
long list of "political, economic, and social principles particularly
necessary for our times," which guarantee, among others, the
following: equality of the sexes; the rights to leisure, employment, to
join a union, to strike, and to obtain social security, education, and
health care; and the responsibility of the state to nationalize all
industries that are either de facto monopolies or that have taken on
the character of a public service. The final product therefore
constitutes an uncomfortable compromise between radically opposed
notions of individual and collective rights, and of the proper
relationship between the state and society.
With rare exception,82 doctrinal authorities (including two future
Constitutional Council members, Georges Vedel and Marcel Waline)
saw in the Preamble a welcome grounding for a renewal of its
objectives. Ignoring the political context that gave it birth, most legal
scholars energetically and overwhelmingly declared its full juridical
status,83 and the old debates were recast, if in wholly recognizable
80. Debats, Assemblee Nationale Constituante, Aug. 29, 1946, J.O. 1946, at 3361-62.
81. Debats, Assemblee Nationale Constituante, Aug. 23, 1946, J.O. 1946, at 3303.
82. See CHARLES-ALBERT COLLIARD, PRECIS DE DROIT PUBLIC 99 (Librairie Dalloz
ed., 1950); GEORGES RIPERT, LE DECLIN DU DROIT 13, 17 (R. Pinchon & R. Durand-Auzias
eds., 1949). Both argued that, since violations of the Preamble would incur no sanction, the
text could not be considered law, but merely an expression of a certain political morality.
Both nonetheless expressed displeasure with having arrived at such a conclusion.
83. See GEORGES BURDEAU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES
346-48 (R. Pinchon & R. Durand-Auzias eds., 1957); MAURICE DUVERGER, MANUEL DE
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 370-74 (5th ed. 1948); GEORGES VEDEL, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 326-27, 552-54 (Librairie du
Recueil Sirey ed., 1949); Fran,.ois Geny, De l'lnconstitutionnalite des Lois ou des A utres
A ctes de l'Autorite Publique et des Sanctions Qu'elle Comporte dans le Droit Nouveau de la
Quatrieme Republique Fram;aise, 1947 JURIS-CLASSEURS PERIODIQUES: LA SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 580, 613; Robert Pelloux, Le Preambule de la Constitution du 27 Octobre 1 946,
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forms. Some renewed efforts to convince judges to introduce judicial
review on their own. Duverger, for example, argued that the Preamble
unambiguously provided judges with a written source of general
principles with which to construct an expansive case law of
fundamental rights.84 Most important, the 1789 Declaration could
finally be judicially incorporated into the constitution by the judiciary;
echoing Duguit, Duverger wrote:
The myth of the 'sovereignty of the National Assembly,' invoked by the
parties on the left, has made it impossible to establish effective
constitutional review.
However, we think that judicial review . . . is possible because no
express provision of the constitution forbids it . . . and because the
obstacles which opposed it under the 1875 regime have disappeared . . . .
We think that judges should have the courage to declare that they will
accept pleas based on the unconstitutionality of legislation.85

Geny agreed, arguing that the preamble "formulates the most
important rules of law" and constitutes "an insurmountable barrier to
the legislature itself" whose enforcement, "in the present state of our
political organization, can only be judicial."8 6
Judges proved less courageous than hoped: to this day, no court
has refused to apply a promulgated law on the basis of its
unconstitutionality. But, if public law lost the war, it also won some
very important battles. The movement's project to restore the primacy
of judges over interpretation largely succeeded. The Conseil d'etat
began to catalogue, quite explicitly, a vast array of constitutional and
extraconstitutional principles that could be invoked in attacking
executive acts, but not statute. These "general principles of law"
include such discoverable notions as "individual liberty,'' "equality
before the law," "freedom of conscience," and "non-retroactivity,'' as
well as previously existing, if unexplained, principles like "the
continuity of public service."87 Related to this development, the
Preamble, and especially the 1789 Declaration, rapidly became a
fertile source for annulments of executive acts,88 and the enforceability
63 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 248, 347 (1947); Jean Rivero & Georges Vedel, Les principes
economiques et sociaux et la Constitution: Le preambule, COLLECTION DROIT SOCIAL, May
31, 1 947, at 13, 15; Marcel Waline, Notes de Juriprudence, 66 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 691,
694 (1950).
84. See OUVERGER, supra note 83.
85. DUVERGER, supra note 83, at 374-78.
86. Geny, supra note 83, at 613.
87. See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH
LAW ch. 6 (1 998); L. NEVILLE BROWN & J. F. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1 19-26 (2d ed. 1 973).
88. See James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 1 89, 197;
see also LEMASURIER, supra note 62, at 187-200.
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of the text was proclaimed in 1956 by the Conseil d'etat in A micales.89
Finally, and most important, the Constitutional Council explicitly
constitutionalized rights review in the 1970s, a move that we now
know was a necessary, absolutely crucial stage in the Council's
courtship of the Public Law establishment. By the end of that decade,
la Doctrine had overcome its long-standing hostility to abstract
"political review."90
By the end of the 1980s, a new scholarly community, le Droit
constitutionnel, had fully emerged. La Doctrine now seeks legitimation
for review, and its own social power,91 by way of Austria, not
America.92
II. TH E EUROPEAN M ODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
The modern European constitutional court is the invention of
Hans Kelsen.93 His followers and close collaborators were present at
the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany,9 4 and they
successfully advocated a variant of the Austrian system as an

89. Conseil d'etat, July 1 1 , 1956, Recueil decisions du Conseil d'etat, 1956, at 317, note
Jacomet.
90. For a recounting of these events, see STONE, supra note 14, ch. 4.
91. The proponents of the "new constitutional law" now aggressively proclaim the
primacy of law over politics, and of the constitutional law over all other domains of law. See
LOUIS FA VOREU, LA POLITIQUE SAISE PAR LE DROIT (Economica 1988); Louis Favoreu, Le
droit constitutionnel, droit de la Constitution et constitution du droit, 1 REVUE FRAN<;:AISE DE
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 7 1 (1990).
92. The canonical texts are CHARLES EISENMANN, LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE
ET LA HAUTE COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE D'AUTRICHE (Librairie Generale de Droit & de
Jurisprudence ed., 1928); and Hans Kelsen, La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 45
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1 97 (1928). Eisenmann, a close student of Hans Kelsen, argued in
favor of a specialized constitutional court. Until the 1 970s, his work was largely ignored.
Today it is viewed as seminal. See LA PENSEE DE CHARLES EISENMANN (Paul Amselek ed.,
Economica 1986).
93. That said, Kelsen partly adapted institutional materials that had developed in
various Germanic federal states of the nineteenth century. For a discussion of the origins of
European constitutional courts, see Klaus Von Beyme, The Genesis of Constitutional Review in
Parliamentary Systems, in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, 2 1 -38 (Christine Landfried ed., 1989).
94. Although I will not focus on the matter here, Germany, too, had its own turn to
natural law, and legal scholars and judges also intensively debated judicial review. In 1863, a
majority of the Association of German Jurists "declared itself in favor of judicial review."
The debate provoked a new wave of constitutional theory culminating in the work of
Kantorowicz, Fuchs, and Schmitt. For a review of these debates, see FRANZ NEUMANN, THE
DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE ch. 2 (1964). During the Weimar Republic,
the Reichtsgericht nullified the application of several statutes adopted by the parliament
during the 1921-25 period. The Court asserted the power to invalidate laws on its own,
without express constitutional authorization, at a time when political authority was too
fragmented to effectively resist. These decisions dealt mainly with the relationship between
property and labor; the Court sided with the former.
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alternative to American judicial review. Italy quickly followed suit.9 5
Kelsen's legacy was secured when constitutional reformers in Spain,
Portugal, and post-Communist Europe all rejected American judicial
review and adopted Kelsenian courts. I will contrast the core elements
of the European and American "models" of review in Part III. In this
Section, I discuss Kelsen's own blueprint for building systems of
constitutional justice in Continental legal systems.
A.

The Kelsenian Court

The most significant experiment in constitutional review in
pre-World War II Europe took place during the Austrian Second
Republic (1920-34), at the instigation of Hans Kelsen. Kelsen
developed the basic template for what we now call the "European
model of constitutional review," first, in his role as the principal
drafter of the Constitution of the Austrian Second Republic, and then
as a legal theorist.9 6 In 1928, he wrote a widely translated article
elaborating and defending the European model of review.97 In that
article, Kelsen argued that the integrity of the legal system, which he
conceived as a kind of central nervous system for the state, would only
be assured if the superior status of the constitution, atop a
hierarchically ordered system of legal norms, could be guaranteed by a
"jurisdiction," or "court-like" body. Because Kelsen foresaw nearly all
of the variations on the European model now in place, and because
Kelsen's constitutional theory remains a standard reference for
debates about the legitimacy of European constitutional review even
today, it is worth examining these arguments closely.
Kelsen faced two hostile camps: politicians suspicious of the
judiciary and judicial power, and a pan-European movement of
prominent legal scholars who favored installing American judicial
review on the Continent. Kelsen understood that the political elites
would not accept the establishment of judicial review in Europe.
Nevertheless, he guessed that a constitutional court, if granted
carefully prescribed powers, might not arouse their hostility. The trick
would be to show that such a system could provide the benefits of
constitutional review without turning into a "government of judges."
95. In 1947-48, representatives to the Italian constitutional convention debated and
rejected American-style judicial review. See Alessandro Pizzorsusso, V. Vigoriti, & G. Leroy
Certoma, The Constillltional Review of Legislation in Italy, 3 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY
311 (1984).
96. Born in the worst of times, the Second Republic functioned properly for barely a
decade before being engulfed by Fascism. The Court's review powers were rescinded by
government decree in 1933. CHARLES GULICK, AUSTRIA BETWEEN HABSBURG AND.
HITLER 185-86, 877-88, 1075-77 (1948).
97. Kelsen, supra note 92. This section is based on ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING
WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE ch. 2 (2000).
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In his 1928 article, Kelsen engaged both fronts at once. First, he
distinguished the work of legislators, which he characterized as
"creative" and "positive," from the work of constitutional judges,
which he characterized as "negative."98 Legislators make law freely,
limited only by procedural constitutional law (which distributes
governing authority among institutions and levels of government and
establishes the rules of the legislative process). Kelsen acknowledged
that the authority to declare legislation unconstitutional is also a
lawmaking, and therefore political, authority:
To annul a law is to assert a general [legislative] norm, because the
annulment of a law has the same character as its elaboration - only with
a negative sign attached
A tribunal which has the power to annul a
law is, as a result, an organ of legislative power.99
.

.

.

.

But if constitutional j udges make law, they do not do so freely, since
judges' decisionmaking is "absolutely determined by the constitution."
A constitutional court is therefore only "a negative legislator."100
Kelsen's distinction between the positive and negative legislator
relies almost entirely on the absence, within the constitutional law, of
a judicially enforceable charter of rights. Here we encounter another
feature of Kelsen's thought, a conception of the law and of the proper
role of courts that goes under the label, "legal positivism." Grossly
simplifying, for positivists the law is that corpus of prescriptions that
some person or group (a lawmaker) has made, which are enforceable
by courts and other state institutions, and which are meant to apply
authoritatively to specific situations. Kelsen's conception of the unity
of the legal system (a hierarchical system of interdependent rules)
rested on the fundamentally positive nature of the constitution.
Positivism is often juxtaposed to "natural law" theories, which
generally assert that human will, however organized in any given
society, is neither the only, nor the ultimate source of law. Instead,
some foundational principles of law (such as human rights) transcend
time and place, and therefore are (or ought to be) directly applicable
in every legal system, even when they have not been proclaimed by a
lawmaker. In the European positivist's legal order, judges apply the
acts of the lawmaker; in the natural law legal order, judges seek to
"discover" and then apply · principles that exist prior to and
independent of any sitting legislature.
Kelsen argued that constitutions should not contain human rights,
which he associated with natural law, due to their open-ended nature.
Adjudicating rights claims, in his view, would inevitably weaken
positivism's hold on judges, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the
98. Kelsen, supra note 92.
99. Id. at 221-41.
100. Id.
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judiciary itself, since judges would become the lawmakers. Thus, he
wrote:
Sometimes constitutions themselves may refer to [natural law] principles,
which invoke the ideals of equity, justice, liberty, equality, morality, etc.,
without in the least defining [precisely] what are meant by these
terms . . . . But with respect to constitutional justice, these principles can
play an extremely dangerous role. A court could interpret these
constitutional provisions, which invite the legislator to honor the
principles of justice, equity, equality . . . as positive requirements for the
[substantive] content of laws.101

To the extent that constitutional judges would actually invoke natural
law, Kelsen demonstrated, they would become positive legislators. A
"government of judges" situation would ensue, and a political
backlash against constitutional review would be the likely outcome.
Second, Kelsen argued that the constitutional court should be able
to review the constitutionality of legislation before its enforcement in
the public realm, thus preserving the sovereign character of statute
within the legal system thereafter. Opposition politicians, sitting in
parliament or in subnational governments within federal systems,
should be able to initiate such review.
Third, Kelsen urged that constitutional courts should look as much
as possible like "judicial" bodies. He insisted that professional judges
and law professors be recruited to the court and emphasized that
"members of parliament or of the government" be excluded; because
the court would play a legislative role, he also proposed that elected
officials should appoint the court's members. Kelsen suggested that
the Court be given jurisdiction over constitutional controversies
brought forward through litigation in the judiciary, as a means of
securing the superiority of constitutional law, and so as to link the
Court's work with formally judicial processes. Finally, individuals
and/or a special constitutional ombudsmen might be given the
authority to refer matters to the Constitutional Court
Outside of Austria, Kelsen's ideas about constitutional justice were
ignored or dismissed during the interwar period. Traditionalists, like
the German theoretician, Carl Schmitt, argued that Kelsen's court
would not function as a court at all, but would instead become a kind
of superlegislature. 102 Proponents of American-style review regarded
Kelsen's ideas as heresy, a brief for "political" rather than "judicial"
review. Most important, across Europe the major political parties
remained hostile to the establishment of review of any kind.
101. Id.
102. CARL SCHMITI, Das Reichsgericht als Huter der Verfassung in.
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE AUFSATZE (1958); Nicol6 Zanon, La Polemique Entre Hans
Ke/sen et Carl Schmitt sur la Justice Consitutionne/le, 5 ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE
JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE 177-89 (1989).
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Legislation must respect constitutional principles, the argument went,
but only legislators should possess the authority to assure that respect.
Of course, the awesome destruction of World War II made
possible the diffusion of the Kelsenian court. The experience of
fascism in Italy and Germany before the war, and the massive
American presence in both countries after it, conspired to fatally
undermine the view that parliaments could do no wrong. Taming the
state - constraining government in a system of democratic controls,
recognizing the liberties of individuals, and embedding states in
pan-European structures (like NATO, the Convention on Human
Rights, and the emerging European Communities) - was suddenly at
the very top of the European agenda. As democratic reconstruction
proceeded, higher-law constitutionalism became the new orthodoxy,
replacing that of legislative sovereignty and the General Will.
The precepts of this "new constitutionalism" can be simply listed:
(1) state institutions are established by, and derive their authority
exclusively from, a written constitution; (2) this constitution assigns
ultimate power to the people by way of elections; (3) the use of public
authority, including legislative authority, is lawful only insofar as it
conforms with the constitutional law; (4) that law will include
constitutional rights and a system of constitutional justice to defend
those rights. As an overarching political ideology, or theory of the
state, the new constitutionalism faces no serious rival today.
The European model of review proved popular because - unlike
American judicial review - it could be easily attached to the
parliamentary-based architecture of the state. Nevertheless, Kelsen's
institutional blueprint had to be modified in one crucial respect.
Kelsen had argued that constitutional courts should be denied
jurisdiction over constitutional rights, in order to ensure that judicial
and legislative functions remain as separate as possible. Since World
War II, Europe has experienced a rights revolution, a hugely
important movement to codify human rights at both the national and
supranational levels. The burden of protecting these rights has fallen
on modern Kelsenian courts.
III. TH E E UROPEAN A N D AMERICAN MO DELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW

Today, two basic models of constitutional judicial review exist in
Western legal systems: the American and the European. The
European model of constitutional review can be broken down into
four constituent components. First, constitutional judges alone
exercise review powers; the "ordinary" (that is, the nonconstitutional)
judiciary may not invalidate norms or acts on grounds of
unconstitutionality. Second, terms of jurisdiction restrict constitutional
courts to resolving constitutional disputes. Formally, constitutional
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judges do not preside over litigation or appeals, per se, which remain
the purview of the judiciary. Instead, constitutional judges answer the
constitutional questions that are referred to them by, among others,
elected politicians and ordinary judges. Third, constitutional courts
have links with, but are detached from, the judiciary and legislature.
They occupy their own "constitutional" space, one that is neither
"judicial" nor "political," as those terms are commonly understood in
Europe. Fourth, most constitutional courts are empowered to
determine the constitutionality of statutes without respect (or even
prior) to their application, usually upon referral by opposition
legislators or other elected officials. This latter mode of review, called
"abstract review," is typically defended as a supplemental guarantor of
constitutional justice, since it can succeed in eliminating
unconstitutional legislation before harm has been done. Thus, in the
European model, the judiciary enforces the supremacy of statute,
while the constitutional court secures the supremacy of the
constitution in relation to all other legal norms.
If European constitutional review is concentrated, in the sense of
being exclusively located in a specialized state organ, American
judicial review is diffuse. In the U.S. "any judge of any court, in any
case, at any time, at the behest of any litigating party, has the power to
declare a law unconstitutional. "103 The power was derived by Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury from Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
Article III confers on the courts jurisdiction over "cases" and
"controversies" that "arise" under the "Constitution" and the "Laws. "
If all American courts may enforce the constitutional law, the exercise
of review powers remains a "judicial" matter to the extent that such
exercise is necessary to resolve specific "cases and controversies." For
the purposes of constitutional law and politics, a "case" is defined as
litigation in which one of the disputing parties alleges to have been
damaged by the enforcement of an unconstitutional law or other
public act.
In Europe, American judicial review is typically portrayed as being
perfectly concrete: it is activated by a claim that the enforcement of an
unconstitutional law caused a real person - one of the litigants actual injury. Abstract review of statutes and other acts appears to be
precluded by the "cases and controversies" requirement. Likewise,
American courts are supposed to deny standing to parties that fail to
show some degree of direct interest in the review of a public act,
although doctrines governing standing have been famously unclear
and unstable.
From an American perspective, European constitutional review
requires the interjection of abstraction into the proceedings. In its
103. Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26
COMP. POL. STUD. 400 (1994).
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pure form, abstract review is preenforcement constitutional review of
legislation. It is abstract because it proceeds in the absence of
litigation: the judge reads the legislative text against the constitutional
law and then decides. There is no storyline or, if there is, the story is
an imaginary or hypothetical one told to highlight the constitutional
moral that comes at the end. What Europeans call "concrete review"
is activated by a reference from a judge to the constitutional court.
What makes concrete review nominally concrete is its connection to being a stage in - a preexisting judicial process. Concrete review is
activated when a j udge sends a question to the constitutional court.
She is required to do so when she has good reason to think that the
controlling statutory or administrative norm is unconstitutional.
European concrete review, however, remains meaningfully
abstract in an overt and formal way. Technically, the task of the
constitutional court is to answer the constitutional question posed for example, is a provision of the code unconstitutional? - not to try
or dispose of litigation. The task of the presiding/referring judge is to
(a) determine if the facts warrant a referral, (b) properly frame the
question to the constitutional court, and ( c) resolve the dispute in light
of the answer given. The remaining basic type of review - the
individual constitutional complaint - is the least abstract in the sense
that an individual must have exhausted all other remedies before
turning to the constitutional court. Thus, when compared to the
Canadian, the Indian, or the U.S. supreme courts, European
constitutional courts were designed as relatively pure oracles of the
constitutional law. Their express function is to interpret the
constitution and thereby to resolve disputes about the meaning of the
constitution, rather than to preside over concrete "cases" in the
American sense.
We can now see that in the United States the "case or controversy
requirement" enables judicial (concrete) review while prohibiting
abstract review. It does so in the service of peculiarly American
separation of powers ideas. In the European model of constitutional
review, a different mix of peculiar ideas not only permits purely
abstract review but insists that concrete review, too, be meaningfully
abstract. Each model defends its own version of separation of powers
as being necessary to preserve distinctions between the "political" and
the "judicial" functions, as these distinctions are umierstood locally.
And each attacks the other version as establishing a "confusion" of
powers that ultimately entails the usurpation of the legislative (or,
more broadly, of the "political") function.
IV. WHY IT MAY NOT MATTER

Traditional separation of powers doctrines in the U.S. and Europe
are in deep crisis. They fail to model what judges actually do when
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they exercise their powers of review; at the same time, the boundaries
separating the "judicial" from the "political (legislative and
executive)" function have blurred to the point of irrelevance. These
claims are obviously too big to defend here, so I will only make two
summary points. First, as documented elsewhere, European
constitutional review has become more concrete as it has evolved.1 04
"Ordinary" judges now engage in a great deal of constitutional
interpretation and review. And constitutional courts (of which the
most obvious examples are the German and Spanish) routinely
determine outcomes, just as any court with general appellate
jurisdiction in the U.S. would: through reviewing the decisionmaking
of public authorities, including j udges, in light of fact contexts and
general policy considerations. These are not surprising outcomes,
given that European constitutional courts, in their rights-based
jurisprudence, have evolved extensive least-means (proportionality)
balancing standards, which they then impose on all governmental
authorities, including parliaments and judges. Second, American
judicial review has become increasingly abstract. In the small space I
have remaining, I will focus briefly on this latter point. 105
A. A bstract Review in the United States
In the jargon of European constitutional law, "the abstract review
of legislation" refers to the review of a statute's constitutionality prior
to its application or enforcement. In the U.S., abstract review occurs
most often in one of the following two situations.106 First, under certain
circumstances, plaintiffs may seek declaratory or injunctive relief by a
judge that, if granted, suspends the application of the law in question
pending judicial determination of its constitutionality. Plaintiffs
commonly file such requests immediately after the statute has been
signed into law by the appropriate authority. Second, under doctrines
first developed by the Supreme Court pursuant to First Amendment
litigation, plaintiffs may attack a law on its face, called a "facial
challenge," and plead the rights of third parties. Although there is
often overlap between these two situations - a plaintiff mounting a
facial challenge to a law will typically ask for preliminary relief - each
deserves to be analyzed on its own.
Preliminary injunctions and declaratory judgments are legal
remedies that were first developed by courts of equity. In the past fifty
years or so, these techniques have penetrated into the constitutional
104. STONE SWEET, supra note 97, at ch. 4-5.
105. See Alec Stone, Qu 'y a-t-il de concret dans le controle abstrait aux Etats-Unis?, 34
REVUE FRAN<;:AISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 227 (1998).
106. Federal courts also continuously exercise the abstract (preenforcement) review of
the rulemaking of federal agencies.
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law, becoming instruments of rights adjudication. Preliminary
injunctions are court orders taken to preserve the status quo ante !item
pending a judicial resolution of the dispute on the merits. Declaratory
judgments are used by judges to clarify the rights of one of the parties
to a dispute, prior to that dispute's resolution. When exercising
judicial review, federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
commonly treat these forms of relief interchangeably. From the point
of view of the plaintiff, moreover, there appears to be little difference
in their relative effectiveness. The criteria that govern the granting of
preliminary injunctions also apply to the rendering of declaratory
judgments. Judges will give relief where a plaintiff's constitutional
rights are at issue, where the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits,
and where the plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury if relief is not
granted.107
All students of American constitutional law know that the
American Supreme Court has held, since Thornhill v. Alabama,108 that
a statute that extends government authority to activities protected by
the First Amendment is presumptively overbroad, and therefore
unconstitutional on its face, regardless of whether, or how, the statute
has been applied in concrete situations. Put differently, the Court
views the normal methods of constitutional adjudication - which
allegedly proceeds on a case-by-case basis and enables the judicial
branch to correct the law over time, with reference to problems raised
as a result of the law's application - to be inappropriate for
adjudicating violations of the First Amendment.1 09 Indeed, the Court
treats the right of free expression as a "preferred freedom" since it
underpins American democracy and the effective exercise of all other
constitutional rights. In this area of the law, restrictive doctrines on
standing and justiciability have therefore been relaxed. It is clear that
the Court has been anxious to use its powers to protect the rights of
individuals and groups who would normally not come before a court,
in so far as they may refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
punishment under a restrictive law.
Thus, in its present form, the doctrine of "overbreadth" carves out
an exception to the general rule, a corollary of the case or controversy
requirement, that an individual cannot plead rights of other
individuals not party to the action. In fact, a court that rules that a

107. The rules are adapted from equity rules. In 1 980, a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
described "the traditional equitable criteria for granting preliminary injunctive relief' as
fourfold: "(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable
injury to plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring
the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases)." L.A. Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'! Football League, 634 F.2d 1 1 97, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
109. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1023-24 (2d ed. 1988).
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statute is overbroad may annul it and reverse the conviction of the
defendant in the case, without having to determine first whether the
expressive conduct of the defendant falls under the protection of the .
First Amendment. In Spokane A rcades, the Supreme Court
summarized its approach to the problem of facial overbreadth and the
rights of third parties in the following terms:
[A]n individual whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be
prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face
because it also threatens others not before the court - those who desire
to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing
so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared
partially invalid. If the overbreadth is "substantial," the law may not be
enforced against anyone, including the party before the court, until it is
narrowed to reach only unprotected activity, whether by legislative
action or by judicial construction of partial invalidation.110

Courts resolve facial challenges in different ways. A court may
render a decision that reduces the reach of a statute, without declaring
its provisions unconstitutional. In such cases, the Court effectively
interprets the statute in a particular way in order to make it
constitutional. This "saving construction" binds the judiciary. A court
may also invalidate the statute as unconstitutional "on its face." A
facial challenge will be successful if a court (1) agrees with the plaintiff
that the law sweeps within its ambit activities protected by the First
Amendment, thereby deterring these activities in a "substantial" and
"socially significant" way, and (2) is unable or unwilling to construct a
more narrow interpretation of the provisions being attacked, or to
"sever" potential constitutional applications of the law from
unconstitutional applications. Of course, even if the appeal fails to
result in a total invalidation of the law, a partial invalidation - an
exercise in "reconstructive surgery" - may be exactly the outcome
the plaintiff wanted. To successfully defend a law, the government
must demonstrate two things. First, it must show that whatever
"chilling effect" on speech the regulation might provoke will not be
substantial but rather improbable and socially insignificant. Second, it
must prove that the statute could not have been drafted more
narrowly, that is, that there was no "less restrictive alternative"
statutory language available. A less restrictive alternative provision is
one that is more likely to exclude unconstitutional applications and to
reduce the deterrent effects of the regulation.
Most invalidations pursuant to judicial findings of overbreadth are
partial invalidations: the court removes provisions that, in its view,
would lead to unconstitutional applications of the law, allowing what
remains of the law to be applied. However, "severing" unconsti110. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985) (footnote omitted)
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
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tutional provisions from an otherwise constitutional statute is not
always possible. If the offending provisions are central to the statute,
the benefits of severability are absent. In such cases, the court has
little choice but to invalidate the entire statute, and no part of it will be
enforceable.111
Although plaintiffs who mount a facial challenge for overbreadth
may claim that the same statute is also unconstitutionally vague,
overbreadth and vagueness are distinguishable.11 2 A statute is vague,
and therefore unconstitutional, if persons "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meanings and differ as to its
application. "113 A vague statute suffers from two interrelated flaws.
First, it entails a high risk of discriminatory enforcement, raising
concerns about due process and equal protection of the laws. Second,
the risk of discriminatory enforcement may itself substantially deter or
"chill" the exercise of rights. To successfully defend a law attacked for
vagueness, the government must show that the deterrent effect of the
statute would not be substantial and that a more precise construction
of its provisions, given the government's purposes, was not possible.
Of course, the abstract review of statutes conflicts with orthodox
understandings of j udicial authority in the U.S. The role of the
judiciary, states the Constitution, is to resolve cases and controversies.
The precise, juridical meaning of the phrase "case and controversy"
has never been fixed, however, which means the courts decide as they
see fit. In practice, the phrase references doctrines related to
separation of powers, standing to sue, and justiciability. Each of these
legal frameworks has been constructed in complex lines of case law
which are by now more or less incoherent, and therefore subject to the
whims of the judges. In what is arguably the most authoritative
statement on the problem by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Warren acknowledged this "uncertainty":
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two
complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words
limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that
the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give
expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case
and controversy doctrine.

1 1 1. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
( 1 980);Connally v. Gen. Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
1 12. See TRIBE, supra note 109, at 1033-35.
1 13. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
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Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope . . . .
[N)o j usticiable controversy is presented when the parties seek
adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for
an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has
been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no
standing to maintain the action. Yet it remains true that "justiciability is
not a legal concept with a fixed content of susceptible or scientific
verification. Its utilization is the resultant of subtle pressures . . . .
"

Additional uncertainty exists in the doctrine of justiciability because
that doctrine has become a blend of constitutional requirements and
policy considerations. And a policy limitation is "not always clearly
distinguished from the constitutional limitation." . . . The "many subtle
pressures" which cause policy considerations to blend into the
constitutional limitation of Article III make the justiciability doctrine
one of uncertain and shifting contours.1 14

No treatise on American constitutional law uses the term "abstract
review." American constitutional practice and scholarship are largely
ignorant of European constitutional law, where abstract review is
ubiquitous. Confronted with a statement to the effect that American
judges do indeed exercise abstract judicial review, an American judge
or constitutional scholar would typically respond in one of two very
different ways. First, the statement might be denied outright. Any law
which substantially deters the exercise of some fundamental,
constitutional right - such as the freedom of speech, or the right to
privacy - creates, by its very existence, a "case or controversy"
between those individuals so deterred and the government that deters
them. This is the logic that underpins doctrines governing facial
challenges and the granting of preliminary relief. Second, in contrast
to the first response, the statement might be recast in terms that make
sense to American judges and lawyers. It could be acknowledged that
the practices described do indeed fall outside the case or controversy
requirement but are relatively limited exceptions to the normal rules
or are pathologies of American case law. Thus, a leading textbook
states that preliminary relief "takes a form suspiciously like that of an
advisory opinion,"115 which is prohibited. And Justice Black, in his
opinion for the majority in Younger, 116 complained that "facial
challenges are fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal
courts" to resolve cases and controversies.

1 14. Flast v . Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
115. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122 (9th ed.
1 993).
1 16. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971).
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However understood, the abstract review of statutes flourishes in
the United States. Indeed, abstract review has become the "normal,"
taken-for-granted mode of adjudicating in the domains of free
speechm and reproductive rights.118 All-important statutes that would
restrict free speech or the right to choose to terminate pregnancies are
routinely attacked on their face and are candidates for preliminary
relief. In such cases, what do American judges do? They make
authoritative guesses about the future: guesses about how people
would likely behave under the law; guesses about how a law would
likely be enforced by public officials; guesses about how a statutory
provision would likely be construed by the courts; and guesses about
how many citizens would likely be hurt if the court permitted the law
to be applied. European constitutional courts, when they exercise
abstract review, make such determinations all of the time, informed,
just as American judges are, by legislative histories and debates, and
by their knowledge of how similar laws have been enforced and
judicially interpreted in the past. Unlike the American courts,
however, European constitutional judges do not have to perform
doctrinal gymnastics to justify their abstract review powers.
The specific techniques of abstract review developed by American
judges are strikingly similar to those developed by European judges. I
will mention three of the most important of these here. First, abstract
review in both places always proceeds through the elaborate
construction of balancing tests. Inevitably, such tests organize the
judicial considerations of hypothetical situations, narratives with
abstractions as characters, stand-ins for real people facing challenging
dilemmas. There is nothing concrete in such review, except in so far as
the decision reconfigures the constitutional environment for the
legislature, for the future. If and when the legislators do so, they will
have to imagine the situation at least partly as the judges have.
Second, once American judges have concluded that specific statutory
provisions are unconstitutional, they then proceed to determine if
these provisions can be severed from the statute to enable the
constitutional, and thus uncontaminated, parts to be applied. What is
perhaps the leading constitutional law textbook in the United States
characterizes this practice as "surgery," or pruning the rotten branches
1 17. In 1996, in an attempt to regulate pornography on the internet, the U.S. Congress
adopted the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"). Knowing that the
constitutionality of the CDA would be litigated before the Act would be enforced,
legislators included a special provision, § 561, designed to expedite the review of the law's
constitutionality in the event of a facial challenge. The law was immediately attacked by
some twenty interest groups, and the provisions attacked were voided by the U.S. Supreme
Court as unconstitutional before they had been enforced against anyone. See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
1 18. State supreme courts, too, exercise abstract constitutional review of statutes. See,
e.g. , Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (concerning parental
consent to abortion in the case of minors).
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from the tree.119 European constitutional judges employ the same
techniques, and judges and scholars use virtually the same language to
describe the process. The French Council, for example, performs
"amputations" on provisions "contaminated" by unconstitutionality,
allowing what remains to be promulgated. Third, American judges and
European constitutional courts routinely participate in the legislative
function by using their review powers to give authoritative
interpretations of statutes - the "saving construction" in American
parlance and "strict reserves of interpretation" in France; other
phrases are used to describe the same things in Germany, Italy, and
Spain. The judges do so in order (1) to permit the law to enter into
force, and thus soften the impact of constitutional review on the
legislature, and (2) to control how the law will be enforced by public
authorities and applied by the judiciary in the future. These
similarities deserve to be studied more closely by comparative
constitutional scholars.
More generally, rights review of legislation, as Kelsen predicted,
makes of the judge a "positive" legislator. Clearly, the more judges are
asked to protect rights in an effective manner - the pan-European
situation - or the more judges consider effective rights protection to
be their constitutional duty - the American situation - the less likely
constitutional review will conform to, or be contained by, separation
of powers doctrines that work to separate things judicial from things
political. Put very differently, in systems in which the supremacy of the
constitutional law within the general hierarchy of norms is defended
by a jurisdictional authority, all separation of powers notions are
contingent because they are secondary to, rather than constitutive of,
the judicial function.
If I have emphasized the relatively formal, doctrinal construction
of abstract review in the U.S., there is a far more profound sense in
which all exercises in judicial review must always be more abstract
than concrete. The power of judicial review is the power to determine
constitutional policy, prospectively. American judges routinely engage
in prospective lawmaking, and therefore in abstract reasoning and
decisionmaking. 1 20
V. CONCLUSION
One issue - the political legitimacy of American judicial review dominates this Symposium on Marbury v. Madison. In sharp contrast
with the European situation, Americans - or at least the legal
1 19. TRIBE, supra note 109, at 1027-33.
120. The argument is made at greater length and detail in Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone
Sweet, A bstract and Concrete Review in the United States, in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION ch. 6 (2002).
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academy - remain deeply divided over the question of if and how to
defend constitutional review.
Most contemporary arguments about the legitimacy of review fall
into one of two broad types. The first type of argument proceeds from
some theory of delegation, that is, from the source and consequences
of enumerated powers. The salient questions are those fetishized by
American lawyers. Does the constitution (or do the People) authorize
review, and under what conditions? How should review powers "fit"
with constitutional structure and separation of powers doctrines? Can
the lawmaking of the "judicial" branch of government be
distinguished from the lawmaking of the "political" branches? The
second type of argument proceeds from a theory, or clash of theories,
about constitutional justice. Europeans, who equate constitutional
justice with rights jurisprudence, tend to focus on different questions.
To what extent do rights provisions possess a transcendental, or
supraconstitutional, juridical status? Do rights necessarily permeate
every domain of law, public and private? Does the structure of rights
provisions, alone and with respect to rest of the constitution, favor
certain forms of interpretation, and certain kinds of balancing
techniques? The orientation seems a natural one, since the very
structure of European rights provisions appears to require the
development of proportionality balancing standards.
As this Symposium shows, American constitutional theory is stuck
in the first type of argument. Americans grapple with, but never finally
resolve, the "countermajoritarian" problem - or, what is to be done
about j udicial supremacy? The theorist may famously demonstrate
that the courts comprise the "least dangerous branch,"121 at least in
some areas of politics, under certain conditions,122 or he may oppose
such claims.123 Ultimately, judges are free to determine for themselves
how intrusive their review of government shall be at any given point in
time, and it is this discretion that causes so much hand-wringing. New
European constitutions expressly provide for review and for the
supremacy of constitutional courts with respect to constitutional
interpretation. European academics and constitutional judges will
state as much in one breath, and then move on to more interesting
issues. For most practical purposes, the formal legitimacy of review is
simply a non-issue. Elected politicians, for their part, have periodically
accused constitutional courts of imposing a "government of judges,"
but such complaints are increasingly muted, when heard at all. At the
121. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
1 22. See, e.g. , PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
123. See, for example, some of the contributions to this Symposium.
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same time, European constitutional courts have steadily consolidated
their positions as powerful policymakers: in just the past three
decades, the French, German, and Italian courts have, respectively,
invalidated more national laws than has the U.S. Supreme Court - in
its entire history.
A century ago, American constitutional theory was avant-garde, a
liberating and invigorating force in Europe. Today by comparison,
American discourse on review appears infirm, defensive, embarrassed
of what cannot be hidden away. Even Marshall's supporters seem to
treat Marbury as if it were the original sin of American consti
tutionalism, the source of timeless tensions inherent and irresolvable.

